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21ST CENTURY-STYLE TRUTH DECAY: DEEP FAKES AND 
THE CHALLENGE FOR PRIVACY, FREE EXPRESSION, 
AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
ROBERT CHESNEY∗ & DANIELLE KEATS CITRON∗∗ 
On February 1, 2019, the Maryland Law Review hosted a spectacular 
symposium entitled Truth Decay: Deep Fakes and the Implications for Pri-
vacy, National Security, and Democracy.1  The Law Review brought together 
scholars and advocates to discuss the deep-fake phenomenon and the loom-
ing challenges to privacy, civil liberties, national security, and civic trust.  
Before we begin our foreword to the symposium papers, we wanted to thank 
Executive Symposium Editor Meredith Storm, Editor-in-Chief Alexandra 
Botsaris, and Managing Editor Caroline Covington for their leadership, hard 
work, and enthusiasm. 
Last spring, after telling them about our work on the topic, Meredith, 
Alexandra, and Caroline decided to dedicate the symposium to the deep-fake 
phenomenon.  Of all of the cyber law issues grabbing headlines, from the loss 
of trust in social media companies to the daily drum beat of data breaches, 
they chose this topic.  As the news from the weeks following the symposium 
showed, these women had foresight.  We are grateful to the staff of the Law 
Review, especially Meredith, Alexandra, and Caroline, for having the vision, 
smarts, and devotion to bring together scholars with an array of perspectives 
to discuss the privacy, free expression, intellectual property, and national se-
curity challenges raised by the emergence of deep-fake technologies. 
                                                          
© 2019 Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron. 
∗ James Baker Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law; Co-Founder, Lawfare. 
∗∗ Morton & Sophia Macht Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey 
School of Law; Affiliate Fellow, Yale Information Society Project; Affiliate Scholar, Stanford Cen-
ter on Internet & Society.  We are so grateful to the editors of the Maryland Law Review and to Sue 
Glueck for providing the Law Review with a Microsoft grant that allowed us to bring symposium 
participants to Baltimore.  Deep thanks to Dean Donald Tobin for supporting the symposium. 
 1.  We adapted this piece from the symposium keynote.  Hence, the informal tone and light 
footnotes.  We take much of the substance of this piece from our forthcoming article.  See Robert 
Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and Na-
tional Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213954. 
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On the day before the symposium, U.S. Senator Angus King appeared 
on MSNBC to discuss President Donald J. Trump’s response to recent testi-
mony by U.S. intelligence chiefs.2  Earlier that week, in public congressional 
testimony, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats and Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency Gina Haspel expressed their disagreement with 
the President’s policy toward Syria and ISIS.3  President Trump responded 
swiftly to the video.  Rather than criticizing them, the President simply as-
serted that neither Coats nor Haspel had disagreed with him.4  President 
Trump said, in so many words, that it was all fake news—that the officials 
said they agreed with his policies.5  When the TV host asked for a reaction 
to the President’s response, Senator King remarked, 
Well, this reminds me of the old country song, Chris, who you go-
ing to believe, me or your own lying eyes?  I mean, the testimony 
is there. I was there.  I asked Gina Haspel very directly, is Iran in 
compliance with the nuclear agreement and she hemmed around a 
little bit but then she said yes it is.  And that’s what their findings 
are.6 
The Senator was telling the hosts to watch the video of the proceedings to 
gauge the truth for themselves.  In other words, videos do not lie. 
Senator King’s response captures the belief in the truth-telling power of 
audio and video recordings.  Even the United States Supreme Court has at-
tested to this power: If a video shows someone driving recklessly, then that 
person drove recklessly.7  Period, the end, no discussion.8  Video and audio 
recordings elicit a visceral response.  Human beings believe what their eyes 
and ears are telling them.9  Video and audio evidence become inscribed as 
truths about the world around us and stories embed quickly into memory.  
Although human beings may be able to dismiss gossip and rumors, especially 
if the gossip and rumors do not accord with their worldview, watching and 
                                                          
 2.  Senator Angus S. King, Jr., Senator King’s Comments with Chris Hayes—January 31, 
2019, YOUTUBE (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ETGviBUGbAQ. 
 3.  Guy Taylor, Intelligence Chiefs’ ‘Threat Assessment’ Refutes Trump Assertions, WASH. 
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jan/29/dan-coats-gina-
haspel-chris-wray-threat-assessment/.  
 4.  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 31, 2019, 1:40 PM), https://twit-
ter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1091088740947320833.  
 5.  See id. (“Just concluded a great meeting with my Intel team in the Oval Office who told 
me that what they said on Tuesday at the Senate Hearing was mischaracterized by the media—and 
we are very much in agreement on Iran, ISIS, North Korea, etc.  Their testimony was distorted 
press . . . .”). 
 6.  Senator Angus S. King, Jr., supra note 2. 
 7.  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007) (ruling that a videotape of a car chase consti-
tuted definitive proof of facts so as to preclude the necessity of a trial on the merits). 
 8.  That is, assuming nothing suggests the video has been altered or tampered in some way. 
 9.  See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of 
Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. HUM. 1, 1–3 (1998). 
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hearing video and audio recordings make it much more difficult to disregard 
the content.  Senator King’s remarks reflect human experience: We ascribe 
truth-telling powers to video and audio recordings.  This response to digital 
imagery is exactly why deep-fake technologies are so powerful.  
DEEP-FAKE TECHNOLOGY 
Faked video and audio recordings are not new—we have long had the 
ability to alter pictures and sounds.  In the past, doctored videos were fairly 
easy to debunk.  Deep-fake technology, however, is poised to produce sig-
nificant change in how we differentiate what is real from what is fake.  The 
technology can insert people’s faces and voices into video and audio doing 
and saying things they never did and said.10  Deep-fake technology—and in 
particular “generative adversarial network” (“GAN”) techniques11—allow 
the wholesale creation of audio and video that is incredibly realistic and in-
creasingly difficult to distinguish from real events.12 
The GAN technique involves neural network algorithms that learn to 
replicate patterns by sifting through large data sets.13  The generator algo-
rithm mines source data (let’s say a trove of photos) for patterns, and it gen-
erates images or videos.  Then, the generated video is subject to an adversar-
ial algorithm, which looks for defects or artificial content. The generator then 
takes a turn, refining the video and eliminating errors.  This process continues 
in a loop, producing highly realistic, yet fake audio and video content.14 
From what we have learned, the most difficult thing to replace is faces, 
so nothing is perfect now.15  But every time there is a breakthrough in the 
detection of deep fakes, there is a counter breakthrough with deep-fake tech-
nology that evades detection.  White-hat technologists and black- or grey-hat 
technologists are locked in a battle.16  As technology emerges that detects the 
                                                          
 10.  James Vincent, New AI Research Makes It Easier to Create Fake Footage of Someone 
Speaking, VERGE (July 12, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/7/12/15957844/ai-fake-video-
audio-speechobama. 
 11.  The GAN approach was invented by Google researcher Ian Goodfellow.  See Ian Goodfel-
low et al., Generative Adversarial Nets, 27 ADVANCES NEURAL INFO. PROCESSING SYS. 2672 
(2014) (detailing the GAN approach); Chesney & Citron, supra note 1 (manuscript at 6). 
 12.  See Will Knight, Real or Fake? AI Is Making It Very Hard to Know, MIT TECH. REV. (May 
1, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604270/real-or-fake-ai-is-making-it-very-hard-to-
know/. 
 13.  See Goodfellow et al., supra note 11; Tero Karras et al., Progressive Growing of GANs for 
Improved Quality, Stability, and Variation (Feb. 26, 2018) (Int’l Conference on Learning Repre-
sentations Paper), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1710.10196.pdf; see also Chesney & Citron, supra note 1 
(manuscript at 6).  
 14.  Karras, supra note 13, at 1–5; Chesney & Citron, supra note 1 (manuscript at 6). 
 15.  Thank you to Andreas Schou of Google for talking to us about the technology. 
 16.  For an explanation of white-, black-, and grey-hat technologists, see Kim Zetter, Hacker 
Lexicon: What Are White Hat, Gray Hat, and Black Hat Hackers?, WIRED (Apr. 13, 2016), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/04/hacker-lexicon-white-hat-gray-hat-black-hat-hackers/. 
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latest deep-fake technology (say the technique finds that veins in the neck are 
not pulsating), a better version of the deep fake hits the scene.  It is unclear 
who will win this arms race, but for now the fight is on. 
So, that is an overview (simplified, of course) of the technology.  Now 
to discuss the concerns that drove us—a national security expert and a pri-
vacy and free speech expert—to join forces to write about deep fakes.  Let’s 
begin by exploring the different kinds of harm that we might see for individ-
uals and society.  Then, we will contemplate the modest role for law and the 
potential for market responses.  We will end by discussing what society can 
do as legal responses and market solutions evolve. 
INDIVIDUAL EXPLOITATION AND SABOTAGE 
Individuals can be targeted with damaging deep-fake videos.17  Let’s 
begin as the deep-fake trend did—no surprise, with deep-fake sex videos.  
About eight months ago, Motherboard published a story about a subreddit 
devoted to deep-fake sex videos of celebrities.18  At the time, the subreddit 
(now closed) had countless threads.  Redditors posted deep-fake sex videos 
of Gal Gadot and Taylor Swift.  These commentators asked each other ques-
tions about deep-fake technology.  A commentator said he wanted to make a 
deep-fake sex video of his ex-girlfriend, but he only had thirty photographs 
of her.  He wondered if the fake app technology available on a desktop would 
work.  Commentators also directed one another to YouTube tutorials provid-
ing instructions on the creation of deep-fake videos.19 
Consider the experience of Noelle Martine.  Ms. Martine was a high-
school student in Australia when she began using social media to post videos 
and photos of herself.20  Someone—a stranger, she thinks—inserted her face 
                                                          
 17.  See Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, Deep Fakes and the New Disinformation 
War: The Coming Age of Post-Truth Geopolitics, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2019, at 153 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-12-11/deepfakes-and-new-disinformation-war 
(“[D]eepfakes are especially dangerous to high-profile individuals, such as politicians and celebri-
ties . . . .”). 
 18.  Samantha Cole, AI-Assisted Fake Porn Is Here and We’re All Fucked, MOTHERBOARD 
(Dec. 11, 2017), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/gydydm/gal-gadot-fake-ai-porn.  For a 
description of subreddits, see What are Communities or “Subreddits”?, REDDIT, https://www.red-
dithelp.com/en/categories/reddit-101/communities/what-are-communities-or-subreddits (last vis-
ited Apr. 6, 2019) (“Reddit is a large community made up of thousands of smaller communities . . . 
known as ‘subreddits.’”).   
 19.  See, e.g., tech 4tress, Deepfakes Guide: Fake App 2 2 Tutorial. Installation (Totally Sim-
plified, Model Folder Included), YOUTUBE (Feb. 21, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lsv38PkLsGU; The Great Zasta, How to Merge Faces with 
Fake App in 5 Minutes!! Quickest Tutorial, YOUTUBE (Feb. 18, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i4bar4X7ghs. 
 20.  See Ally Foster, Teen’s Google Search Reveals Sickening Online Secret About Herself, 
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into pornographic images and posted them online.  Shortly after, posters re-
vealed her home address and cell phone number.  Not long thereafter, a deep-
fake sex video of Ms. Martin appeared, showing her performing oral sex on 
someone.  She was inundated with death and rape threats, and strangers con-
tacted her for sex.  Keep in mind that Ms. Martin was just a high-school stu-
dent.  Ms. Martin contacted law enforcement and government agencies but 
was told that nothing could be done about the postings.  Instead, law enforce-
ment suggested she contact the webmasters of the numerous websites on 
which the false images were displayed and request they be taken down.21 
Rana Ayyub, a journalist in India, wrote about Hindu nationalist poli-
tics.  Her pieces explored concerns about corruption in Hindu national polit-
ical parties.  A deep-fake sex video of her appeared and went viral.  The video 
was shared via Twitter and text messages.  It appeared next to her home ad-
dress alongside her phone number and one phrase: “I am available.”22  Ms. 
Ayyub went into hiding.  She was deluged with death and rape threats.  For 
weeks, she could not write, let alone speak.  She could barely eat.  She was 
terrified.23 
Deep-fake sex videos are likely to have a disproportionate impact on 
women and marginalized communities, as is true of other sexual-privacy in-
vasions.24  As Ms. Martin and Ms. Ayyub underscored, it is incredibly dis-
turbing to be turned into a sex object.  Deep-fake sex videos reduce individ-
uals to genitalia, breasts, buttocks, and anus, creating a sexual identity not of 
the individual’s own making.25  If a deep-fake sex video appears in a Google 
search of one’s name, it can be impossible to get or keep a job.  It can have a 
profound impact on one’s social life and sense of safety. 
Deep-fake videos could also be used to sabotage corporate CEOs and 
their companies.  Imagine the night before an Initial Public Offering, a deep-
fake video appears online showing the company’s CEO soliciting a child 
prostitute or saying something he shouldn’t say in a way that upends the pub-
lic offering of the company’s stock.  Yes, the video could be debunked in a 
few days, but the damage has already been done.  If released at a crucial time, 
                                                          
 21.  TEDx Talks, Sexual Predators Edited My Photos into Porn—How I Fought Back, Noelle 
Martin, TEXxPerth, YOUTUBE (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PctUS31px40. 
 22.  Rana Ayyub, Opinion, In India, Journalists Face Slut-Shaming and Rape Threats, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/opinion/india-journalists-slut-sham-
ing-rape.html. 
 23.  Id. . 
 24.  At the Maryland Law Review symposium, Panelists Mary Anne Franks and Ari Waldman 
explored the impact of deep-fake videos on women and marginalized communities.  See Mary Anne 
Franks & Ari Ezra Waldman, Sex, Lies, and Videotape: Deep Fakes and Free Speech Delusions, 78 
MD. L. REV. 892 (2019).  Quinta Jurecic and Benjamin Wittes connected deep-fake videos to their 
important work on sextortion.  See Maryland Carey Law, Truth Decay—Maryland Law Review 
Symposium Keynote Address, YOUTUBE (Feb. 6, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WrYlKHiWv2c.  
 25.  See Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L. J. (forthcoming 2019). 
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a deep-fake video could destroy the marketplace’s faith in a CEO or com-
pany.  Depending on the timing of the release, a deep-fake video can hijack 
people’s lives and companies’ fortunes. 
NATIONAL SECURITY PERILS 
Deep-fake videos can have profound implications for national security.  
For example, in the middle of sensitive negotiations, diplomats could be 
shown a deep-fake video suggesting an adversary is disingenuous.  The video 
could scuttle the diplomacy.26  Far more violent possibilities are implicated 
as well.  Imagine a deep-fake video released in Gaza showing Israeli soldiers 
murdering a Palestinian child.  Violence could explode, with devastating con-
sequences for regional stability. 
Let’s consider the City of Baltimore the day after Freddie Gray was 
killed in police custody.27  City residents were overrun with grief, especially 
the black community.  The black community was justifiably angry and frus-
trated after the death of Mr. Gray.  False arrests and mistreatment by police 
officers were routine in Baltimore City.28  Imagine if a deep-fake video ap-
peared of the police officers responsible for Mr. Gray’s death in which they 
said they were ordered to kill Mr. Gray.  As most readers know, the day after 
Mr. Gray’s death was characterized by protests and civil unrest.  If such a 
deep-fake video had appeared and gone viral, we might have seen far more 
violence and disruption in Baltimore.  If the timing was just right and the 
video sufficiently inflammatory, we might have seen greater destruction of 
property and possibly of lives. 
TRUTH DECAY AND ELECTIONS 
Deep-fake technology is emerging at a difficult time.  The public is in-
creasingly distrustful of the media and public officials (at least the public 
officials who are not aligned with their preferences).  Deep-fake videos ex-
acerbate distrust in civic and democratic institutions.29 
                                                          
 26.  Panelists Benjamin Wittes, Quinta Jurecic, and Alan Rozenshtein explored national secu-
rity issues at the Maryland Law Review Symposium, including whether we might see offensive 
counterintelligence measures involving deep-fake content.  See Maryland Carey Law, supra note 
24.  
 27.  See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Stephen Babcock, Scenes of Chaos in Baltimore as Thousands 
Protest Freddie Gray’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2015), https://www.ny-
times.com/2015/04/26/us/baltimore-crowd-swells-in-protest-of-freddie-grays-death.html.  
 28.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT (2016), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3010223-BPD-Findings-
Report.html; David A. Graham, The Horror of the Baltimore Police Department, ATLANTIC (Aug. 
10, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/08/the-horror-of-the-baltimore-police-
department/495329/. 
 29.  At the symposium, panelists Jessica Silbey and Woodrow Hartzog raised important con-
cerns about privacy and free expression related to deep fakes.  Deep fakes decontextualize narratives 
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A deep-fake video could hijack elections, eroding faith in our democ-
racy.  What if the night before the 2018 election a deep-fake video showed a 
candidate locked in a tight race engaging in anti-social behavior that he never 
engaged in.  The national security community is wrestling with concerns 
about deep fakes in connection with the 2020 elections.30  This does not mean 
that a deep-fake video cannot be debunked in time.  But a well-timed deep 
fake could change an election’s outcome—the damage would be irreparable.  
Elections usually cannot be undone.  It is easy to imagine the potential for 
deep disruption to our democracy. 
Further, our shared sense of reality is in jeopardy.  A healthy democracy 
requires a shared set of truths and facts for citizens to consider, debate, and 
ponder.  Deep-fake videos undermine the possibility of having conversations 
about a shared reality and exacerbate the disinformation wars that disrupt 
democratic politics. 
Then there is what we have called the “Liar’s Dividend.”31  The problem 
is not just that deep-fake content can be used to stoke social, political, and 
ideological divisions.  As people become more aware of the existence of deep 
fakes, wrongdoers may find it easier to cast doubt on real recordings of their 
mischief.  Recall that President Trump has tried to leverage this possibility.  
After the 2016 election, he denounced the Lester Holt interview32 (where he 
admitted that he fired FBI Director James Comey because of that “Russia 
thing”)33 and the Access Hollywood tape (where he said when you are a star 
you can “grab ‘em by the pussy”) as fakes.34  If the public were more sensi-
tized to the issue of deep-fake content, perhaps his assertions would be be-
lieved.  Our society is imperiled when people can escape accountability for 
their words and actions by ascribing genuine audio and video content to deep-
fake technology. 
                                                          
and so the question they raised is how we might as citizens resituate and recontextualize the fakery 
rather than regulate them.  See Jessica Silbey & Woodrow Hartzog, The Upside of Deep Fakes, 78 
MD. L. REV. 960 (2019); Maryland Carey Law, supra note 24.  
 30.  See Donie O’Sullivan, Lawmakers Warn of ‘Deepfake’ Videos Ahead of 2020 Election, 
CNN (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/28/tech/deepfake-lawmakers/index.html. 
 31.  Chesney & Citron, supra note 1 (manuscript at 28). 
 32.  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 30, 2018, 4:02 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1035120511259500544?lang=en.  
 33.  See Brian Stelter, Team Trump Says NBC News Edited Holt’s Exclusive Interview. Here’s 
the Truth, CNN (Sept. 20, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/09/20/media/sekulow-trump-lester-
holt-interview/index.html.  
 34.  Maggie Haberman & Jonathan Martin, Trump Once Said the ‘Access Hollywood’ Tape 
Was Real. Now He’s Not Sure, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/11/28/us/politics/trump-access-hollywood-tape.html.  
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LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
Unfortunately, there are no easy answers to this difficult problem.  
While several legal and technological approaches could help mitigate the 
threat, none will eliminate the problem.  As thoughtful computer scientist and 
privacy policy wonk Edward Felten once explained, with hard tech policy 
problems, lawyers tend to point to technologists for the answers, and the tech-
nologists tend to point to the lawyers.35  We need both lawyers and technol-
ogists to tackle the deep-fake problem.  And we need a heavy dose of societal 
resilience to make our way through these concerns. 
We should be watching advances in authentication technologies.36  
Companies like Truepic are working on methods of authentication.37  If those 
methods are adopted broadly (a big “if”), it would help quickly authenticate 
content.  The problem is that platforms are likely to continue posting content 
with few restrictions on provenance.  Unless platforms refuse to post content 
without certain authentication markers (highly unlikely given the “more eye-
balls” advertising business model), there is little reason to think that a given 
authentication strategy will be widely adopted.  As explored at the outset, 
because forensic technology is engaged in an arms race, there is little reason 
to place our hopes on a slam-dunk technical solution. 
What about the law?38  Individuals could sue deep-fake creators for def-
amation or intentional infliction of emotional distress.  But for civil claims to 
work, harmed individuals would need to find perpetrators, those perpetrators 
would have to live in the United States (for the court to have any chance of 
having jurisdiction over them), and individuals would have to have funds to 
pay for counsel.  Given those hurdles, civil litigation is not a practical re-
sponse.39  There are criminal laws related to impersonation that would be 
fruitful so long as law enforcement has training in the law and technology.40  
The First Amendment would likely countenance prosecutions for deliberate 
                                                          
 35.  Paul Ohm, Breaking Ed Felten’s Third Law: How Not to Fix the Internet, DENVER L. REV. 
ONLINE (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.denverlawreview.org/how-to-regulate/2010/2/22/breaking-
feltens-third-law-how-not-to-fix-the-internet.html. 
 36.  See Chesney & Citron, supra note 1 (manuscript at 30–31) (discussing technological solu-
tions). 
 37.  A Holistic Approach to a Complex Problem, TRUEPIC, https://truepic.com/technology/ (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2019).  
 38.  See Chesney & Citron, supra note 1 (manuscript at 31–45) (discussing legal solutions). 
 39.  See id. (manuscript at 33–41) (considering the possibility of civil liability). 
 40.  See id. (manuscript at 42–45) (addressing categories of criminal liability).  Panelist Mary 
Anne Franks discussed the possibility of amending identity theft statutes to address deep fake sex 
videos.  Professor Franks is currently working with members of Congress on such an idea.  Senator 
Ben Sasse has proposed a federal criminal statute that would extend to individuals and platforms 
that publish deep fakes knowing that they are fake and knowing that they enable crimes or torts.  
See Malicious Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018, S. 3805, 115th Cong. (2018).  Members of his 
staff attended the symposium, and it sparked important conversations about the free speech impli-
cations as well as the potential for platform liability. 
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impersonations of individuals.  We can punish deliberate lies because they 
concern the source of who is speaking.  Proscribing those lies is permissible 
because such lies threaten significant harm to listeners who rely on them as 
a proxy for reliability and credibility.41 
Now to platforms.42  Under current law, online service providers enjoy 
a broad sweeping immunity from liability for user-generated content.  As one 
of us has argued with fellow symposium participants Benjamin Wittes43 and 
Quinta Jurecic,44 federal immunity should condition the immunity on reason-
able moderation practices rather than the free pass that exists today.  The 
current interpretation of that federal statute—Section 230 of the Communi-
cations Decency Act—leaves platforms with no incentive to address destruc-
tive deep-fake content.45  That should change.46 
What about the possibility of people protecting themselves with authen-
tication services?47  Companies might begin offering alibi services—the 
practice of recording every aspect of one’s life.  For instance, imagine an 
amplified Google Glass that focused on oneself at all times, providing 
twenty-four-hour surveillance of one’s activities.  Such services would help 
counter the deep fake by allowing a person to refute any allegations with 
recorded surveillance.  One could respond to a deep-fake video with the fol-
lowing: “I was not there saying or doing that terrible thing because my alibi 
services show that I was miles away doing and saying something else.”  As 
Scott Peppet suggests, however, lifelogging would be deeply invasive and 
risks the broader unraveling of privacy.48  Even if only a small number of 
people took up lifelogging, they would produce vast reservoirs of personal 
                                                          
 41.  Helen Norton, Lies to Manipulate, Misappropriate, and Acquire Government Power, in 
LAW AND LIES 143, 165–76 (Austin Sarat ed., 2015); Marc Jonathan Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing, and 
(Deep) Fake News, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 59, 110 (2018).  Panelists Kate Klonick and Thomas Kadri 
talked about the free speech implications of addressing deep fakes, including the possibility of par-
ody deep-fake content.  See Thomas E. Kadri, Drawing Trump Naked: Curbing the Right of Pub-
licity to Protect Public Discourse, 78 MD. L. REV. 899 (2019); Maryland Carey Law, supra note 
24.  
 42.  See Chesney & Citron, supra note 1 (manuscript at 36–41) (considering liability for plat-
forms). 
 43.  See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad 
Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 407 n.52 (2017). 
 44.  DANIELLE CITRON & QUINTA JURECIC, HOOVER INST., PLATFORM JUSTICE: CONTENT 
MODERATION AT AN INFLECTION POINT (2018) (Aegis Ser. Paper No. 1811), https://www.hoo-
ver.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/citron-jurecic_webreadypdf.pdf. 
 45.  See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).  
 46.  Panelists Olivier Sylvain and Stacey Dogan raised crucial questions about platform liability 
in the face of deep fakes.  See Maryland Carey Law, supra note 24. 
 47.  See Chesney & Citron, supra note 1 (manuscript at 53–58) (anticipating market solutions).  
 48.  Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full 
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data in which the rest of us would find ourselves inadvertently caught, creat-
ing a massive peer-to-peer surveillance network for constantly recording our 
activities. 
We have far more questions than answers.  That is why we wanted to 
bring together the smartest people we know to talk about the privacy, free 
speech, intellectual property, and national security implications of deep-fake 
content.  And that we did at the Maryland Law Review Spring 2019 Sympo-
sium—we owe a debt of gratitude to the participants in the discussion and to 
Microsoft’s Sue Glueck who ensured that we could bring everyone together 
at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law in Balti-
more. 
